On a Nonlinear Feedback Strategy Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game by Kenji Fujiwara & Norimichi Matsueda
On a Nonlinear Feedback Strategy Equilibrium of a Dynamic
Game 
Kenji Fujiwara Norimichi Matsueda
School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University
Abstract
This paper reports an intriguing property of a nonlinear feedback Nash strategy equilibrium
in a dynamic game with no state variable in the payoff of each player. While the open-loop
Nash and linear feedback Nash equilibria coincide with the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium
in such a framework, the nonlinear feedback strategy can be properly defined and,
furthermore, a particular type of the equilibrium outcomes approximates the bilateral
collusion, as is originally proved by Tsutsui and Mino (1990) for a standard differential game
with one state variable.
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The purpose of this note is to report an interesting property of a nonlinear feedback
Nash strategy equilibrium of a dynamic game. In our dynamic game model of pollution,
no state variable enters the objective functionals of the players, which are two polluting
rms. At this stage, it would be natural to presume that both the open-loop and feedback
equilibria coincide with the static solution due to the lack of a state variable in their
respective payos. However, we demonstrate that this conjecture may not hold true if a
nonlinear feedback strategy is employed while it applies to the equilibria supported by
open-loop and linear feedback strategies.1
The paper is planned as follows. Section 2 lays out our basic model and derives its
open-loop Nash equilibrium. After obtaining the linear and nonlinear feedback Nash
equilibria, we formally prove this somewhat counter-intuitive result and discuss its cause
and economic implications in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The Model: Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
2.1 The Model
We consider a homogeneous good duopoly consisting of rms 1 and 2, both of which are
completely identical in all characteristics. As a by-product, each rm emits a pollutant,
whose amount is proportional to its output level. The inverse demand function of the
good is specied linearly as:
p = a   x1   x2; a > 0
1The derivation of a nonlinear feedback strategy equilibrium in this paper follows that of Tsutsui and
Mino (1990). For technical details, see Dockner et al. (2000).
1where p is the price of the good and xi;i = 1;2, denotes each rm's output. The pollutant
is assumed to accumulate in an environmental body according to
_ Z = x1 + x2   Z;  2 [0;1]; (1)
where Z is the pollution stock and  is its decay rate. Then, letting c > 0 be the marginal







 t(a   c   xi   xj)xidt; subject to (1);  > 0;
where  is the discount rate. Note that these rms do not suer from the pollution
problem.
2.2 Open-Loop Nash Equilibrium
Let us begin by solving the Nash equilibrium of the above model under open-loop formu-
lation. To this end, let us set up rm i's current value Hamiltonian:
Hi = (a   c   xi   xj)xi + i(xi + xj   Z);
where i denotes rm i's co-state variable associated with (1). Then, the optimality
conditions consist of (1) and
0 = a   c   2xi   xj + i (2)
_ i = i( + ) (3)
0 = limt!1 e tiZ:
Solving the system of equations made of (2) for rm i as well as rm j, the equilibrium
output is given by
xi =
a   c + 2i   j
3
: (4)
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2Based on (5), the following property of the open-loop Nash equilibrium can be ob-
tained:
Proposition 1. The steady state in the symmetric open-loop Nash equilibrium uniquely
exists and is saddle point stable. Moreover, the optimal output is invariant to time and
the pollution stock.
Proof. In the steady state where _ 1 = _ 2 = _ Z = 0, 1 = 2 = 0 can be easily conrmed






where the superscript O indicates the open-loop Nash equilibrium. (6) tells us that the
optimal output depends neither on time nor on the state variable. Further substitution






The saddle point stability can be checked easily as well. Letting the eigenvalue as-






 +    y 0 0









= (    y)( +    y)
2 = 0;
from which the two eigenvalues are positive and given by y =  + , and the other is
negative and given by y =  . Since (5) contains one state variable and two jump
variables, this establishes the saddle point stability. Q. E. D.
3 Feedback Nash Equilibria
3.1 Feedback Formulation
This section turns to another solution concept: a feedback Nash equilibrium. In order to
pay attention to not only a linear feedback strategy but also a nonlinear feedback strategy,
3we adopt the derivation method of a nonlinear feedback strategy equilibrium introduced
by Tsutsui and Mino (1990). It begins by dening each player's Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation:
V (Z) = max
xi
f[a   c   xi   xj(Z)]xi + V
0(Z)[xi + xj(Z)   Z]g; (8)
where the function V () is rm i's value function:2





 (s t)[a   c   xi   xj(Z)]xids
 
 _ Z = xi + xj(Z)   Z

:
The rst-order condition for maximizing the right-hand side of (8), combined with
the symmetry condition, xi = xj, yields
V
0(Z) = 3x(Z)   (a   c); (9)
Then, substituting (9) into (8), we have an identity in Z:
V (Z) = [a   c   2x(Z)]x(Z) + [3x(Z)   (a   c)][2x(Z)   Z]:




( + )[3x(Z)   (a   c)]
8x(Z)   3Z   (a   c)
; (10)
which gives the slope of an uncountable number of feedback strategies. Resorting to the
diagrammatic method of Tsutsui and Mino (1990) and Dockner and Long (1993), such
nonlinear strategies can be depicted by the integral curves in Figures 1 and 2.
3.2 Linear Feedback Nash Equilibrium
Before moving on to a nonlinear feedback strategy equilibrium, let us briey consider
some properties of the linear feedback Nash equilibrium. The linear strategy can be
obtained as follows. Let us assume that the strategy is linearly dependent on the state
variable: x(Z) = Z + . In such a case, x0(Z) =  and (10) takes the form of
 =
( + )[3(Z + )   (a   c)]
8(Z + )   3Z   (a   c)
;
2The subscript i to the value function is dropped for notational simplicity.
4which is equivalent to
(8   3   6)Z + (8   3   3)   (      )(a   c) = 0:
The two unknown coecients  and  must satisfy this equation, which lead to the
















While the former pair corresponds to xb in Figure 2 and the latter pair to xa, only xb
survives the condition of asymptotic stability. As a result, we can state:
Proposition 2. Suppose that each rm plays a linear feedback strategy. Then, the
resulting Nash equilibrium output is invariant to time and the pollution stock, and it is
identical with the static Cournot-Nash outcome.
3.3 Nonlinear Feedback Nash Equilibrium
Finally, we explore the implication of a nonlinear feedback strategy equilibrium. While
there are numerous nonlinear feedback strategies, we focus on one particular strategy,
which is denoted by xN in Figure 2. If the domain of the initial pollution stock is
properly dened, xN can be supported by an equilibrium strategy. Then, it converges to
N over time. At N, the steady state condition implies that x = Z=2 and the slope of




2   (a   c)
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where the left-hand side gives the slope of xN at x = Z=2, whereas the right-hand side
is the slope of the _ Z = 0 line. Solving this equation for Z, the steady state stock of
pollution is immediately obtained as
Z
N =
(2 + )(a   c)
(3 + 2)
; (11)
and the corresponding output in the steady state becomes
x
N =
(2 + )(a   c)
2(3 + 2)
; (12)
5where the superscript N refers to this particular nonlinear feedback Nash equilibrium.
Then, from (12), we can state a seemingly surprising result:
Proposition 3. As  ! 0, this equilibrium output approaches the static monopoly output
in the steady state.
Proof. Through a simple calculation, the monopoly output is given by (a c)=2. On the









and hence the industry output is (a   c)=2, which is nothing but the monopoly output.
Q. E. D.
It might appear at rst that all of the open-loop, linear feedback, and nonlinear
feedback strategy equilibrium outcomes coincide with one another and are the same as
the static solution due to the lack of the state variable in the payo function. However,
Proposition 3 states that such a view is incorrect. Then, a question arises: why does a
nonlinear strategy equilibrium outcome deviate from the static solution?
In the open-loop formulation, no state variable enters each player's objective function






 t [a   c   xi   xj(Z)]xidt
subject to _ Z = xi + xj(Z)   Z:
That is, the state variable indirectly enters each player's payo since player i seeks to
maximize its payo by anticipating that its rival's strategy is a function of the state
variable. As a result, this indirect inuence of the state variable on player i's decision can
make a nonlinear strategy equilibrium dierent from the open-loop and linear feedback
strategy equilibrium. The same can be observed in any game situation where each player
i's payo depends not only on its own choice variable but on its rival's choice variable.
This implies that the all of the equilibrium outcomes above coincide with the static
6solution when each player's payo depends only on its own control variable and no state
variable.
Concerning the implications of this result, it suces to cite Tsutsui and Mino's (1990)
statement in a context of dynamic duopoly:  as the discount rate r approaches to zero,
the upper bound pH asymptotically approaches the collusive stationary price p
joint (Tsutsui
and Mino, 1990, p. 154).3 What should be stressed here is that the same observation can
hold even when no state variable enters each player's payo function. Hence, the scope
of their nding is actually larger than is generally known. Indeed, the monopoly outcome
can be achieved in the limiting case with  ! 0 according to Proposition 3. When a
stock pollution issue is a signicant concern of a government, one way to ameliorate the
pollution problem would be simply to encourage rms to employ non-linear feedback
strategies and let them act non-cooperatively.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have demonstrated that, even in a dynamic game model where no state
variable enters the players' objective function, a nonlinear feedback strategy equilibrium
can deviate from the static solution while the open-loop and linear feedback strategy
equilibria coincide with the static solution. This seemingly counter-intuitive result orig-
inates from the fact that the state variable enters player i's objective indirectly through
its anticipation of the rival's strategy. Our result indicates broader applicability of the
novel nding of Tsutsui and Mino (1990), i.e., a certain feedback strategy equilibrium
approximates the monopoly outcome, provided that the discount rate is suciently small.
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